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Abstract: This article analyses how Mandeville’s Treatise of the 
hypochodriack and hysterick passions (1711) was received in the medical 
environment, and I show that this work, in spite of being unusual and of 
a satirical nature, was seriously read and studied by eighteenth-century 
physicians. In the second part I will describe hypochondria as it is 
intended in the Treatise, with particular attention to talking therapy. In 
the third part I will show that in the Fable of the bees and in the Enquiry 
into the origin of honour hypochondria is associated with a frustration 
of the desire to be esteemed, and that in light of the theory of self-liking 
expressed in the Fable, it is possible to account for talking therapy’s 
effectiveness as theorised in the Treatise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The central theme in Mandeville’s works is the acknowledgment of the 
crucial role that self-liking plays in human matters. Self-liking is a 
natural passion “by which every Individual values itself above its real 
Worth” (Mandeville 1924b, 130). Yet, as human beings tend to be 
insecure about their true value, public image and social appreciation is 
of great importance to them. Self-liking is the psychological cause of the 
desire to be esteemed by other human beings. It is the desire for social 
recognition which allows Mandeville to explain human behaviour at 
different levels, from everyday social relationships to commercial 
exchanges, religion, and politics. This is captured in a significant 
passage in the Fable of the bees part II, whereupon Mandeville sums up 
the results of his studies on human nature: “the most superlative Wish, 
which a Man possess’d, and entirely fill’d with it can make, is, that he 
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may be well thought of, applauded, and admired by the whole World, 
not only in the present, but all future Ages” (Mandeville 1924b, 64). 
Thus, if human behaviour can be explained by the desire for social 
recognition, what happens then when such need is not satisfied, or 
worse, when the interest itself in the opinion of others disappears?  
Mandeville argues that when the desire to be esteemed fades the 
symptoms of hypochondria appear. In this article I show how those 
same symptoms that Mandeville himself described in his work on 
hypochondria and hysteria, Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick 
diseases, are found (at least implicitly) in both the Fable of the bees and 
in the Enquiry into the origin of honour.  
However, before addressing the central point of this article I will 
dedicate a few pages to discuss the reception that the Treatise received 
in eighteenth-century Britain. This is important not only because of the 
lack of studies on this subject, but because this research will show that, 
in spite of his satirical style, Mandeville was taken seriously by the 
physicians of his time. I will then move on to examine in detail the 
Treatise, which is very interesting for three reasons: firstly, 
hypochondria is approached from a point of view that is not strictly 
medical, but takes into account psychological and existential elements; 
secondly, great importance is attributed to the relationship between 
physician and patient; finally, a kind of talking cure is theorised. I 
proceed to argue that in the Fable a moral conception of hypochondria 
is present, according to which hypochondria is caused by the absence of 
self-liking. From this perspective, the relationship of trust between 
doctor and patient, coupled with talking therapy, would re-establish the 
patient’s interest in the “opinion of others”. The comparison between 
hypochondriac symptoms as described in the Treatise and the effects of 
weakened self-liking as described in the Fable constitutes the main 
evidence for my thesis.   
 
II. MANDEVILLE AND THE DIFFUSION OF THE TREATISE OF THE 
HYPOCHONDRIACK AND HYSTERICK DISEASES 
Until recently, the Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases 
was one of the least known of Mandeville’s works. However, there has 
been a change of trend, as indicated by new translations of the Treatise 
into Italian (Mandeville 2009) and French (Mandeville 2012), and by the 
appearance of several articles on the text, as well as an entire volume 
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dedicated to the conception of hypochondria in Mandeville.1 The 
increasing interest in the Treatise is justified for at least two reasons: 
first, a talking cure is now considered to be fundamental in psychology 
and psychiatry, rendering Mandeville’s Treatise an interesting historical 
document. Second, increasing attention has been paid to Mandeville’s 
medical training and to the influence that his studies on hypochondria 
may have had on the development of his theory of the passions. Such a 
theory was gradually put together over the twenty-year span, from the 
first edition of the Fable of the bees in 1714 to the publication of the 
Enquiry into the origin of honour in 1732.  
The Treatise was first published in 1711, six years after Mandeville 
had written the apologue The grumbling hive. It was then reprinted in 
1715, shortly after the publication of the first edition of the Fable.2 In 
1730 Mandeville published a proper second edition, expanded in length 
by about a third and with a slightly changed title.3 At that time 
Mandeville had just given to the press the Fable II and was presumably 
busy writing the Enquiry into the origin of honour.  
Apparently the Treatise was quite well received, perhaps exceeding 
expectations, judging by the fact that the publisher issued a second 
print only a few months after the first. Besides, while in the first edition 
the frontispiece contains Mandeville’s personal address, in the reprint 
he decided to omit it, replacing it with a few lines inviting whoever was 
interested in starting therapy to get in touch with him through the 
bookseller or the publisher. This little amendment suggests that 
Mandeville might have been annoyed by readers soliciting his help. 
Since there are no studies on the diffusion of the Treatise in the 
eighteenth century, it is difficult to say at this stage if and how 
Mandeville’s theories were discussed by his contemporaries. Some brief 
observations attest that the Treatise circulated among English, Scottish, 
and Irish physicians. 
                                                
1 See Leigh (1961, 23-28); Veith (1965, 153-154); Rousseau (1975, 11-21); Shoenberg 
(1976); Carrive (1980, 71-96); Jackson (1986, 287-289); Collins (1988); McKee (1991); 
McKee (1995); Cook (1999); de Marchi (2001); Branchi (2004, 24-40); Simonazzi (2004, 
293-411); Schmidt (2007, 150-162); Simonazzi (2008, 97-151); Hilton (2010); Kleiman-
Lafon (2013). 
2 The Fable of the Bees was published for the first time in 1714 in the form of a 
comment to the apologue The grumbling hive (1705), and was subsequently expanded 
in the 1723 edition and in the final one of 1724. In December 1728 (on the frontispiece 
the date 1729 appears) Mandeville gave to press the Second Part of the Fable in the 
form of a dialogue. 
3 Mandeville substitutes the term “passions” with “diseases”. 
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 Mandeville’s name appeared for the first time in a medical work 
within the Observations in physick, both rational and practical, written 
by Thomas Apperley, in 1731. Apperley, who was a fellow of St. John’s 
College, Cambridge, quotes Mandeville in support of his thesis on the 
function of menstruum in the digestive process (Apperley 1731, 183-
184). The Treatise was later quoted as an authoritative source on food 
properties, in particular on fish, by physician Thomas Withers (Withers 
1777, 115-116). In 1782, William Black quotes Mandeville three times in 
his An historical sketch of medicine and surgery (Black 1782, 163, 220, 
276). Mandeville’s name is associated with that of Dr Robert Pitt (1653-
1712), author of Crafts or the frauds, where he blows the whistle on the 
business agreement between doctors and chemists, all to the detriment 
of the patients. In the final pages of his book, Black lists the most 
important works on various symptoms, and the Treatise is quoted next 
to Cheyne’s work. Two years later, Mandeville’s name appears as an 
authoritative source on diet in the London Society of Physicians (A 
Society of Physicians in London 1784, 6: 119-120). In 1786 The Yorkshire 
magazine quotes Mandeville as the source of the principle according to 
which “if you like it, it’s good for you”, which was supposed to 
demonstrate the existence of a self-regulatory mechanism within the 
human body (The Yorkshire magazine 1786, 1: 50-51). If we look at 
dictionaries and encyclopaedias, we see that the entry “Mandeville” 
appears in A new biographical dictionary (Jones 1796, 293), and three 
years later it is included in Biographia medica as well (Hutchinson 1799, 
2: 115-122). Even in Ireland the Treatise must have had a certain 
resonance, as demonstrated by the fact that the name of Mandeville 
appears in Pharmacomastix by Charles Lucas, published in Dublin in 
1741. Lucas denounces the corruption of chemists in the sale of 
medicines, and the risk that medicines themselves may be adulterated. 
He repeatedly quotes Mandeville in support of the danger constituted by 
chemists (Lucas 1741, 38-39). 
Nonetheless, it is in Scotland, at the Edinburgh Medicine Faculty, 
that Mandeville’s medical work received acclaim. Mandeville’s fortune in 
Scotland was probably due to Robert Whytt, King George III’s physician 
(starting in 1761) and president of the Royal College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh. Whytt began his studies in Edinburgh, but subsequently 
attended Paris and Leyden universities. In 1765 Whytt published a work 
on hypochondria in which he quotes Mandeville among the authors who 
identified digestion as one of the causes of hypochondria and hysteria 
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(Whytt 1765, 109). The list of these authors includes the most important 
physicians of the previous century, such as Highmore, Willis, Ettmüller, 
Sydenham, Boerhaave and Cheyne.  
The Treatise appears in Edinburgh University Library (Catalogus 
librorum 1798, 234), but only in its first 1711 edition, the same quoted 
by Whytt. In the timespan from 1766 (the year immediately after the 
publication of the Observations) to 1795, at least three students 
specialising in nervous diseases quoted Mandeville in their academic 
dissertations: Jacobus Boswel in 1766 (the year following the publication 
of Whytt’s work); Joannes Cowling in 1768, whose supervisor was 
William Robertson; and Joannes Haxby, in 1795, whose supervisor was 
George Baird. The Treatise frequently appears in medical libraries and in 
eighteenth century booksellers’ catalogues too. In 1798 Sir Alexander 
Crichton, a Scottish physician well-known for having described what is 
now called “attention deficit hyperactivity disorders”, quotes Mandeville 
to describe the digestive symptoms caused by hypochondria (Crichton 
1798, 194). 
In conclusion, this first reconstruction of the Treatise’s reception in 
the eighteenth century demonstrates that Mandeville was taken 
seriously not only as a philosopher and author of the Fable of the bees, 
but also as a physician specialising in hysterical and hypochondriac 
diseases. The Treatise appears to have sparked interest, above all, 
through its study of the relationship between hypochondria and 
digestion, the importance of diet, its censure of chemists, and its attack 
on drug abuse. There are no references to the talking cure or to a moral 
etiology of hypochondria. The analysis of the Treatise’s reception does 
not supply significant elements to relate the Treatise and the Fable. On 
the contrary: the two works were usually regarded separately. 
Mandeville himself did not mention the Fable in the Treatise nor the 
Treatise in the Fable. However, it is my contention that a point of 
contact exists between the two works: the theory of human passions. 
The Treatise, for example, not only analyses the hypochondriacs’ 
passions, but also the physicians’ passions (in particular “pride”) by a 
method of analysis developed in the Fable. And in the Fable, Mandeville 
uses his medical and psychological skills to explain the symptoms of 
shame and, above all, to advance a theory of the causes of suicide. 
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III. HYPOCHONDRIA AND TALKING CURE 
What does Mandeville mean when he talks about hypochondria? 
Mandeville never says what hypochondria exactly is. In a way, the whole 
Treatise can be read as an attempt to find a definition for hypochondria 
through the description of its symptoms and the identification of its 
causes (Rousseau 1975, 14-15). Such an attempt, however, is destined to 
fail for at least three reasons. Firstly, because it is not a disease like any 
other, but a psychosomatic one, the causes of which are both of a 
physical nature (such as a digestion problem and indulgence in sexual 
pleasures) and of a psychological nature (such as fear of poverty and 
excessive study) (Mandeville 1981, 5-7). Secondly, a specific 
symptomatology does not exist, and so all cases are different from each 
other. Finally, because there is a very fine line between a simple, non-
pathological melancholy disposition of the individual, as defined by 
Robert Burton in his The anatomy of melancholy, and a true melancholy 
habit, that is a proper pathology. 
The Treatise is written in the form of a dialogue, spread through 
three days, between a physician called Philopirio, who represents 
Mandeville himself (Mandeville 1976, xi), and a hypochondriac patient, 
named Misomedon, and his wife, Polytheca, suffering from hysteria. A 
fourth character is their daughter, also affected by hysteria, who never 
appears on the scene.4 The dialogue form was not an original choice for 
a medical work, it was nonetheless an original decision to address the 
patients rather than his medical colleagues: “I conceiv’d it would be less 
Presumption, if I writ by way of Information to Patients, that might 
labour under them, than if I pretended to teach other Practitioners, that 
profess to cure them as well as my self” (Mandeville 1981, ix-x). This 
choice allows Mandeville “to deviate from the usual Method, and make 
what I had to say as palatable as I could to those, I had in view for my 
Readers” (Mandeville 1981, x-xi). 
His method consists of making the patient tell his own life story. 
The importance of telling the disease history had been theorised before 
by Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), who had taken inspiration from 
Bacon’s reflections on the importance of classification and natural 
history. This method was supposed to be applicable to any kind of 
disease. It consisted of following the evolution of the various cases, 
comparing them, and identifying their common elements, so as to 
                                                
4 Hysteria is simply the name given by Mandeville to hypochondria when it affects 
women. 
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distinguish what was peculiar to the patient from what was specific to 
the disease: “The whole philosophy of medicine consists in working out 
the histories of diseases, and applying the remedies which may dispel 
them; and Experience is the sole guide” (Sydenham 1696, 518). 
Mandeville follows in Sydenham’s footsteps who, together with the 
physician Giorgio Baglivi (1668-1707), is quoted in the Treatise as one of 
his medical references. Sydenham’s narrative of the disease history 
differs from that of the Dutch physician in many ways. First of all, the 
hypochondriac patient in the Treatise tells a life story, more than a story 
of disease. It takes into consideration events such as his father’s death, 
his economic and social condition, occupation, relationship with family 
and friends, readings, travels, and amusements. As a second instance, 
Mandeville does not try to identify patterns or to formulate 
classifications. His interest in the patient is holistic, taking into 
consideration her history and specific individuality, not her disease, nor 
her medical history and classification of clinical case: “It is unreasonable 
to think, that from so general a Rule, sick People, and the several 
differences between one sick Person and another, or the same Person 
when sick of different Distempers, should be the only Exception” 
(Mandeville 1981, 79). Mandeville stresses the importance of 
psychological factors when building a rapport with the patient: “more 
especially those, in which the Fancy has so great a Share” (Mandeville 
1981, 377). He also emphasizes that the patient must play an active role 
in therapy (Mandeville 1981, 380). 
Therapy, as exposed in the Third Dialogue, does not include the use 
of drugs. It only requires exercise, healthy food, and a sound 
relationship between physician and patient, which is predicated on 
listening and talking:  
 
If your Medicines do me no Good, I am sure your Company will […]. 
You can’t imagine, how a pertinent lively Discourse, or any thing that 
is sprightly, revives my Spirits. I don’t know what it is that make me 
so, whether it be our talking together, the Serenity of the Air, or 
both; but I enjoy abundance of Pleasure, and this Moment, methinks, 
I am as well as ever I was in my Life (Mandeville 1981, 45-46).  
 
Paulette Carrive maintained that by choosing the dialogue form, 
Mandeville meant to appear like “a man in conversation with his patient, 
in which patient and physician engage in a discussion about the illness 
as an issue of mutual concern, but at the same time separate from 
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both”5 (Carrive 1980, 78-79). Francis McKee, instead, remarked that “by 
dramatizing the medical discourse, Mandeville attempts to produce a 
cathartic effect on the reader and patient. The dialogues ‘divert’ and 
‘entertain’, thus combating hypochondria at some degree” (McKee 1995, 
226). Surely, the form of a dialogue allows Mandeville to reach three 
goals: 1) to provide a vivid picture of hypochondria symptoms; 2) to 
show the subjective perception of the illness; 3) to show the therapy at 
work.  
However, the Treatise leaves much to be desired regarding the 
etiology of its therapy, which is to say, it does not disclose what talking 
therapy is exactly, nor how it works.  
 
Talking therapy 
Mandeville’s most direct source is probably Giorgio Baglivi, whose work 
underscores the importance of imagination and emphasized that self-
suggestion worsened the illness (Baglivi 1843, 211). Furthermore, he 
insisted that violent therapies be avoided and urged against the use of 
pharmacological treatment without joint psychological therapy; this 
promoted the tranquility and serenity of the patient (Baglivi 1843, 213-
214).  
In the Treatise (1711) frontispiece, Mandeville promises to his 
readers to reveal “a Method intirely new” to treat hypochondria. 
However, upon opening the book the reader would have noticed that 
Mandeville dedicates much space to criticize traditional therapies, while 
the “Method intirely new” is shown, rather than explained or theorised. 
The Treatise is really the presentation of a theory in progress. Only in its 
last pages does Mandeville really clarify his new method. The patient 
Misomedon, voicing the reader’s curiosity and bewilderment, asks 
Mandeville directly: “Then what is your Secret in the Cure of this 
difficult Distemper?” (Mandeville 1981, 343). Mandeville replies: “I allow 
my self time to hear and weigh the Complaints of my Patients” 
(Mandeville 1981, 343). Misomedon is surprised and disappointed (as 
Mandeville imagines all his readers will be): “But I meant Medicines, 
when I spoke of Secrets” (Mandeville 1981, 344). Philopirio replies that, 
as to the medicines, he has no secrets. He answers Misomedon this way: 
                                                
5 My translation from the original in French: “un homme conversant avec son malade, malade et médecin 
discutant ensemble de la maladie comme d’une chose qui à la fois les concerne tous deux et qui 
cependant leur est extérieure.” 
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“Then I must answer you, that […] I have no Nostrums that I intend 
either to magnify or conceal” (Mandeville 1981, 344). 
Only by radically changing the outlook is it possible to detect the 
method’s novelty. At the end of the Treatise, Mandeville reveals his 
secrets to his readers. The rules to follow are three. First, to let patients 
speak, and not to prescribe them useless medicines. The second is a 
condition of the first: the physician must be ready to listen to his 
patient carefully, putting himself into the other’s shoes, understanding 
his idiosyncrasies, getting to know his food aversions and exercise 
habits and preferences. In short, the physician must use his deep 
knowledge of the patient to tell which features are only part of human 
nature and which ones are due to the illness (Mandeville 1981, 344). 
Talking therapy implies that the patient must play an active role and 
gain an understanding of the causes of his own illness. Such 
understanding is part and parcel with the therapy itself, even though 
Mandeville himself cannot explain the reason:  
 
I am glad, that at last you are happily enter’d into a Sentiment of 
things which Words cannot express; and now I hope, looking back on 
the Passages of your Life, you’ll easily find out your self the 
Procatartick Causes of your Distemper (Mandeville 1981, 208). 
 
Physiological and psychological causes of hypochondria 
Throughout the Treatise Mandeville criticises speculative physicians—
i.e., those doctors who ignore experience and let themselves be carried 
away by “Flights of Invention in Physick” (Mandeville 1981, 95). The 
Dutch philosopher maintains that it is necessary to adhere to the most 
rigorous observation. However, epistemological scepticism and the 
empirical method are incompatible with the passionate structure of 
human nature. As Misomedon observes: 
 
What I was going to tell you is, that, tho’ I am convinced from what 
you have said, that Reasoning about Causes is not to be depended 
upon, […] yet I find it is impossible to do without. There is a Gap 
between the Observations made on the Symptoms of a Disease, and 
what Experience teaches us about the Cure of it: I want to have that 
Gap fill’d up (Mandeville 1981, 230). 
 
Upon Misomedon’s explicit request the physician Philopirio 
hypothesises about the cause of hypochondria. Mandeville states that 
the immediate cause of hypochondria is a digestion defect due to the 
lack of those animal spirits that constitute a fundamental component of 
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the menstruum, or ferment, through which foods are turned into chyle 
and therefore absorbed by the body via an action of blood. The problem 
is, therefore, to identify the cause of the excessive consumption of 
animal spirits: 
 
the immoderate Exercise of the Brain, and Excess of Venery, are so 
generally the Occasion of the Hypochondriack Passions, that in all 
my Experience I have hardly met with any, where I had not Reason to 
impute the Distemper, in Part at least, to one or other of these, if not 
both: I speak of Patients, in whom the Malady has been confirm’d. It 
was then the Waste of Spirits, that robbing the Stomachick Ferment 
of what was required for its Volatilization, occasion’d those fix’d 
acid Salts that gave you the Heart-burning which was your first 
Complaint (Mandeville 1981, 212-213). 
 
The waste of animal spirits may be due to a multiplicity of causes, 
from excessive study and sexual activity to “the least Emotion of my 
Mind” (Mandeville 1981, 215). Mandeville pays particular attention to 
the relationship between socio-economic status and hypochondria. He 
claims that wealth is a predisposing factor because, on the one hand, it 
urges the fear of losing one’s belongings and, on the other hand, it 
stimulates passions and desires that are difficult to satisfy. Fear and 
dissatisfaction are psychological causes of the loss of animal spirits: 
 
Immoderate Grief, Cares, Troubles and Disappointments are likewise 
often Concomitant Causes of this Disease; but most commonly in 
such, as either by Estate, Benefices, or Employments have a 
sufficient Revenue to make themselves easie: Men that are already 
provided for, or else have a Livelyhood by their Callings amply 
secured, are never exempt from Sollicitudes, and the keeping not 
only of Riches, but even moderate Possessions, is always attended 
with Care. Those that enjoy ‘em are more at leisure to reflect, 
besides that their Wishes and Desires being larger, themselves are 
more likely to be offended at a great many Passages of Life, than 
People of lower Fortunes, who have seldom higher Ends, than what 
they are continually employed about, the getting of their daily Bread 
(Mandeville 1981, 219-220).     
 
In this way, hypochondria is connected to passions, wishes, 
expectations, social condition, desire for social advancement, fear of 
failure, and self-realization. It is a psychosomatic disease because the 
psychological dimension acts on the animal spirits, which are involved 
in digestion and can disturb the stomach. Mandeville, therefore, puts 
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mind and stomach in strict relation through the mediation of animal 
spirits. 
 
IV. HYPOCHONDRIA AND SELF-LIKING 
This section argues that if we want to find a psychological hypothesis 
regarding the causes of hypochondria we must set aside the Treatise, 
and focus our attention on the theory of passions developed in the Fable 
II and in the Enquiry. A psychological or moral etiology of melancholy 
can already be found in the works of some philosophers such as Michel 
de Montaigne, Robert Burton, and Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, in 
particular, stated in Leviathan (1651) that mental health is a matter of 
balancing the dominant passion, since mental illness is caused by 
excessive strength or weakness of the desire for power. Excessive self-
esteem (i.e., vain-glory or pride) is the cause of madness, while an 
excessive insecurity results in dejection of mind: “The Passion, whose 
violence, or continuance, maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-Glory; 
which is commonly called Pride, and selfe-conceipt; or great Dejection of 
mind” (Hobbes 2012, 112)..  
In the beginnings of his career, Mandeville’s interest was mainly of a 
medical nature, but after 1711 the Dutch philosopher probably 
neglected the study of medicine (as stated in the Preface to the edition 
of the Treatise in 1730) and dedicated himself to developing his theory 
of the passions (Mandeville 1981, xxii). In particular, his attention was 
concentrated on the passion of self-liking. In the Preface to Fable II, 
Mandeville describes himself (alias Cleomenes) as a man who, after a 
medical education, dedicated himself to philosophy (Mandeville 1924b, 
16). In the second dialogue he reveals an important insight into human 
nature: the importance of other people’s opinions and the desire to be 
esteemed (Mandeville 1924b, 64). Mandeville’s emphasis on self-liking is 
the result of twenty years of reflection, and runs parallel to his studies 
on hypochondria. We may say that in the Treatise Mandeville analyses 
the pathology of passions, whereas in the Fable and in the Enquiry he 
tries to outline their physiology. This research develops gradually, and it 
is only in the Third Dialogue of the Fable II, that is seventeenth years 
after the publication of the Treatise’ first edition (and a few months 
before the second edition was issued), that Mandeville introduces the 
concept of self-liking for the first time (Mandeville 1924b, 131). Then, it 
is in the Enquiry into the origin of honour, published in 1732 (two years 
after the publication of the Treatise’ second edition) that the Dutch 
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physician completes his theory, modifying along the way the views 
expressed in Fable I.6 In the Enquiry he makes a distinction between self-
liking (self-esteem), self-love (self-conservation instinct) and pride (a vice 
deriving from an excess of self-liking): 
 
Hor: I now understand perfectly well what you mean by Self-liking. 
You are of Opinion, that we are all born with a Passion manifestly 
distinct from Self-love; that, when it is moderate and well regulated, 
excites in us the Love of Praise, and a Desire to be applauded and 
thought well of by others, and stirs us up to good Actions: but that 
the same Passion, when it is excessive, or ill turn’d, whatever it 
excites in our Selves, gives Offence to others, renders us odious, and 
is call’d Pride. As there is no Word or Expression that comprehends 
all the different Effects of this same Cause, this Passion, you have 
made one, viz. Self-liking, by which you mean the Passion in general, 
the whole Extent of it, whether it produces laudable Actions, and 
gains us Applause, or such as we are blamed for and draw upon us 
the ill Will of others. 
Cleo. You are extremely right; this was my Design in coining the 
Word Self-liking (Mandeville 1971, 6-7).    
 
Self-liking should not be confused with the desire for social 
recognition: they are inseparable, but they are not the same thing. In 
fact, self-liking is “that great Value, which all Individuals set upon their 
own Persons; that high Esteem, which I take all Men to be born with for 
themselves” (Mandeville 1971, 3). Love of praise or desire for applause 
is only the effect of self-liking (Mandeville 1971, 5). The desire for social 
recognition is so important because self-liking… 
 
seems to be accompany’d with a Diffidence, arising from a 
Consciousness, or at least an Apprehension that we do over-value 
ourselves: It is this that makes us so fond of the Approbation, Liking 
and Assent of others, because they strengthen and confirm us in the 
good Opinion we have of ourselves (Mandeville 1924b, 130). 
 
Mandeville explicitly states that a good balance of the passion of 
self-liking is the necessary ingredient for good mental health. It is 
significant, in my opinion, that Mandeville himself shows a certain kind 
of reluctance in linking self-liking with health and psychological illness, 
almost as if he found it difficult to reconcile the Treatise with the Fable:  
                                                
6 In Fable I Mandeville affirmed that pride and shame were two separate passions; in 
the Enquiry, instead, he states that they are both symptoms of self-liking (Mandeville 
1971, 12). 
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Hor: Self-love I can plainly see induces him to labour for his 
Maintenance and Safety, and makes him fond of every thing which 
he imagines to tend to his Preservation: But what good does the Self-
liking to him? 
Cleo: If I should tell you, that the inward Pleasure and Satisfaction a 
Man receives from the Gratification of that Passion, is a Cordial that 
contributes to his Health, you would laugh at me, and think it far 
fetch’d (Mandeville 1924b, 134). 
 
In this regard, it is the passage where Cleomenes fears ridicule that 
Mandeville indicates the introduction of a new and counterintuitive 
concept. The desire to be esteemed is a fundamental element for 
psychological health. Mandeville doesn’t explicitly theorise that self-
liking plays a role in hypochondriac symptoms. However, in the Fable of 
the bees there are a series of hints that attest to Mandeville’s 
preoccupation with hypochondria while describing the effects of 
deficient self-liking; these effects range from depression to suicide. If we 
compare the hypochondriac symptoms described in the Treatise, for 
example, with the psychological symptoms linked to low self-esteem 
found in the Fable, not only do we notice an extraordinary similarity but 
(at least in one case) the use of the very same description. 
In what follows, I will examine two key-passages of the Fable: the 
first relates to the symptoms of shame (one of the effects of self-liking); 
the second is the description of the psychological state of those who 
want to commit suicide (the most severe form of hypochondria). 
Shame is the symptom of the wound of self-liking:  
  
When a Man is overwhelm’d with Shame, he observes a Sinking of 
the Spirits; the Heart feels cold and condensed, and the Blood flies 
from it to the Circumference of the Body; the Face glows; the Neck 
and part of the Breast partake of the Fire: He is heavy as Lead; the 
Head is hung down; and the Eyes through a Mist of Confusion are 
fix’d on the Ground: No Injuries can move him; he is weary of his 
Being and heartily wishes he could make himself invisible: But when, 
gratifying his vanity he exults in his Pride, he discovers quite 
contrary Symptoms; his Spirits swell and fan the Arterial Blood; a 
more than ordinary Warmth strengthens and dilates the Heart; the 
Extremities are cool; he feels Light to himself, and imagines he could 
tread on Air; his Head is held up; his Eyes are roll’d about with 
Sprightliness; he rejoices at his Being, is prone to Anger, and would 
be glad that all the World could take Notice of him (Mandeville 
1924a, 67-68; see also Mandeville 1971, 12-13). 
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ThatWe can point out at least five elements. 1) Shame causes a loss 
of animal spirits (“a Sinking of the Spirits”), which is exactly the cause of 
digestive problems, leading to hypochondria. 2) One of the symptoms of 
shame is the wish to be invisible—i.e., the annihilation of self-liking. (By 
contrast, when one’s degree of self-liking is high, then that person 
“would be glad that all the World could take Notice of him”). 3) 
Symptoms of shame are described in the Fable as a general heaviness of 
heart and head (“the Heart feels cold and condensed […] He is heavy as 
Lead”). Symptoms of Hypochondria have the same characteristics in the 
Treatise: “Sometimes my Spirits are oppress’d of a sudden with an 
unaccountable Sadness, and I feel a great Weight at my Heart; at the 
height of this Anxiety I am often seiz’d with such a terrible Fits of 
Crying, as if I was to be dissolv’d in Tears, by which yet I am generally 
reliev’d” (Mandeville 1981, 267). 4) Mandeville uses the same expression 
to define the symptoms of hypochondria and to describe the symptoms 
of a man who is ashamed, that is who is wounded in his self-liking. In 
fact, in the Treatise, Misomedon describes his psychological symptoms 
in order of increasing intensity. The most severe one invites the outcry: 
“Such a lerna malorum and Syndrome of Evils made me weary of my 
Life” (Mandeville 1981, 27). In Fable I Mandeville writes: “He is weary of 
his Being”. 5) Even in those passages where Mandeville doesn’t use the 
very same words, hypochondria’s psychological symptoms are similar to 
those attributed in the Fable to patients who suffer from a lack of self-
liking. Compare, for example, the suicide-passage from Fable II 
(analysed below) with the Treatise’s description of the symptoms of 
hypochondria: “a vast enormous Monster, whose Savage force may in an 
Instant bear down my Reason, Judgment, and all their boasted Strength 
before it […] I know it, I resist it, yet I can’t overcome it” (Mandeville 
1981, 53). It is a disease that “possess’d my Fancy for hours together, till 
the Horror of them entring deeper into my Soul, sometimes struck me 
with such unspeakable Pangs of Grief, as no Torture, or Death could 
ever be able to give the like” (Mandeville 1981, 49). The patient exclaims 
“How strange a thing in this Distemper of mine! To be so extraordinary 
well between whiles, as I am now, and sometimes to be plung’d into 
such an Abyss of Misery” (Mandeville 1981, 46). 
In the Enquiry into the origin of honour Mandeville states that the 
Fable of the bees can be read as an attempt to describe the symptoms of 
self-liking: “The Author of the Fable of the Bees, I think pretends 
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somewhere to set down the different Symptoms of Pride and Shame” 
(Mandeville 1971, 11). 
This passage on the symptoms of shame is fundamental; in fact, 
Mandeville uses it twice (once in the Fable I and once in the Enquiry) to 
emphasize the essential function that self-liking plays in one’s 
psychological health. In the Enquiry Mandeville emphasises the 
connection between shame and the extirpation of self-liking: 
“Sometimes Shame signifies the visible Disorders that are the Symptoms 
of this sorrowful Reflection on our own Unworthiness […] all the Marks 
of Ignominy, that can be thought of, have a plain Tendency to mortify 
Pride; which, in other Words, is to disturb, take away and extirpate every 
Thought of Self-liking” (Mandeville 1971, 11). 
Another crucial passage is the famous passage about suicide in Fable 
II, where Mandeville theorises that suicide is due to frustration of self-
liking: vilified self-esteem may cause such suffering to overcome the 
natural resistance of self-preservation. Self-liking may become a cause 
of hatred against oneself: 
 
Whilst Men are pleas’d, Self-liking has every Moment a considerable 
Share, tho’ unknown, in procuring the Satisfaction they enjoy. It is so 
necessary to the Well-being of those that have been used to indulge 
it; that they can taste no Pleasure without it, and such is the 
deference, and the submissive Veneration they pay to it, that they 
are deaf to the loudest Calls of Nature, and will rebuke the strongest 
Appetites that should pretend to be gratify’d at the Expence of that 
Passion. […] It [Self-liking] is the Mother of Hopes, and the End as 
well as the Foundation of our best Wishes: It is the strongest Armour 
against Despair, and as long as we can like any ways our Situation, 
[…] we take care of ourselves; and no Man can resolve upon Suicide, 
whilst Self-liking lasts: but as soon as that is over, all our Hopes are 
extinct, and we can form no Wishes but for the Dissolution of our 
Frame: till at last our Being becomes so intolerable to us, that Self-
love prompts us to make an end of it, and seek Refuge in Death 
(Mandeville 1924b, 135-136).  
 
Mandeville is here claiming that self-liking is necessary for 
psychological well-being: it is the source of hopes and wishes, the 
foundation of care of ourselves. If the psychological mechanism does 
not work properly (and, when this happens, we no longer seek the 
esteem of others) then “self-love prompts us to make an end of it, and 
seek Refuge in Death”.  
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Self-liking can turn into an apparent self-hatred, as pointed out by 
Horace: “You mean Self-hatred; for you have said your self, that a 
Creature cannot love what it dislikes” (Mandeville 1924b, 136). How can 
self-liking turns into self-hatred? Mandeville deems this impossible. He 
therefore claims, interestingly, that suicide is rather the last desperate 
act of kindness towards oneself: it puts to an end suffering that cannot 
otherwise be avoided: “whoever kills himself by Choice, must do it to 
avoid something, which he dreads more than that Death which he 
chuses. Therefore, how absurd soever a Person’s Reasoning may be, 
there is in all Suicide a palpable Intention of Kindness to ones self” 
(Mandeville 1924b, 136).  
The evidence mustered here suggests that the psychological cause of 
hypochondria is a shortage of self-liking, which, in turn, causes low self-
esteem and the annihilation of the desire for approval and sociability. 
Hypochondria is the loss of self-liking, the lack of faith and interest in 
other people’s esteem. Evidence of this becomes apparent if we contrast 
characteristics of self-liking with the symptoms of hypochondria: they 
are opposites. Self-liking is the principle of sociability, while 
hypochondria causes loneliness. Self-liking is the desire for other 
people’s esteem, while hypochondria is the lack of interest in other 
people’s judgment.  
One main virtue of my interpretation is that it explains why talking 
therapy is so effective: it allows the patient to regain the lost sense of 
self-liking. The physician’s role would be to delve into the complex 
psychological and passionate world of his patient, and to re-establish a 
dialogue that may give back faith and interest in himself and in his 
public image. The therapy, then, would consist of self-analysis and 
introspection: “In Distempers, where the Imagination is chiefly affected, 
Men, without any other Remedies, may often reason themselves into 
Health” (Mandeville 2001, 187). 
The Treatise suggests that there is a correlation between stomach 
disorders, hypochondria, and talking therapy; but Mandeville doesn’t 
explain how words can affect the stomach, even if he does try to 
identify the link between stomach and thought. It is worth noting that 
Mandeville’s examples demonstrate the influence of thought on the 
stomach (bad thoughts interfere with appetite and favourite foods are 
more easily digested)—though not the reverse. The framework, opened 
by new considerations on self-liking dynamics, allows the reader to 
identify a link between the psychic and somatic dimensions of personal 
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health. Stomach ailments can be seen as an effect of hypochondria, not 
as one of its causes. This resolves the Treatise’s tensions: diminished 
self-liking is the cause of hypochondria, stomach disorders is one of the 
illness’ symptoms, and the spoken word would play the role to retrieve 
the patient’s lost sense of self-liking.  
Let me reiterate my argument in brief: self-liking can cause either 
pride or shame. Pride or shame can manifest themselves physiologically. 
Excessive shame ruins the stomach because of “a sinking of spirits”. 
Hypochondria thus has both psychological and physical pain. In 
practice, it makes one lonely and solitary. The cure is social interaction, 
but the patient does not want interaction because society has shamed 
him. The talking cure mimics interaction by reintroducing the regulative 
mechanism of social appreciation. 
While there is textual evidence and we can track precedents among 
those who identify the cause of hypochondria in something similar to 
what Mandeville calls self-liking (pride, glory or desire for power), the 
etiological problem remains an open question, of which Mandeville 
himself reconsidered several times, highlighting the dangers of 
attempting to find medical explanations beyond what we can observe 
and experience: “Physicians, with the rest of Mankind, are wholly 
ignorant of the first Principles and constituent Parts of Things, in which 
all the Virtues and Properties of them consist” (Mandeville 1924b, 161-
162). 
It is impossible, however, to explain through observation alone and 
without resorting to conjectures how and why words may influence the 
symbolic dimension and the passions, and in which way passions and 
ideas may interact with the body. It is possible to show that words have 
a therapeutic effect, as it is possible to detect the existence of a relation 
between symbolic and physic dimensions; nevertheless, according to 
Mandeville, to reach a better definition is a mission that goes beyond 
human capacities: 
 
I am persuaded that our Thoughts, and the Affections of the Mind, 
have a more certain and more mechanical Influence upon several 
Parts of the Body, than has been hitherto, or in all human 
Probability, ever will be discovered (Mandeville 1924b, 162).  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
I started off by analysing the talking cure; this constitutes one of the 
most important aspects of the foregoing historiography. I then 
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investigated the explanations that Mandeville provides for its 
effectiveness. Furthermore I have argued that the theory of the passions 
that the Dutch physician elaborated in the twenty years between the 
first edition of the Fable and the Enquiry may provide an answer to 
problems that remained unsolved in the Treatise (1711). In particular, I 
defended the thesis that within the Fable is a theory of hypochondria 
that is based on a lack of self-liking. To this end, I showed that when 
Mandeville describes the symptoms of a lack of self-liking he resorts to 
the very same description that he makes for the symptoms of 
hypochondria. One unsolved problem in the Treatise concerns the 
talking cure work—i.e., how does it work? Mandeville couldn’t solve this 
from a medical perspective by investigating the pathology of the 
passions. However, his philosophical perspective provides a framework 
for investigating the passions via a theory of self-liking. 
The elaboration of his theory of passions runs parallel to his studies 
on hypochondria, but self-liking appears for the first time only in Fable 
II in 1729. Mandeville was unable to fully realize his project of 
“anatomizing the invisible Part of Man” (Mandeville 1924a, 145), and to 
discover the fundamental role of the desire to be esteemed, in order to 
apply them to his research on the causes of hypochondria. The Dutch 
physician left us with a medical work, the Treatise, where he describes 
his particular therapeutic method based on talking therapy and trust 
between doctor and patient; he also left us with a philosophical thesis, 
found in the Fable and in the Enquiry into the origin of honour, in which 
we can find a theory of the passions that explains the reasons why such 
a therapy is effective. 
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